Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated 12/12/2024
Date of Engagement by: November 5th, 2024 - November 5th, 2024
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
4
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
3
Informational
1
AgentCoin TV
engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts revisions on November 7th, 2024. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided to the Halborn team.
Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.
The team at Halborn was provided 1 day for the engagement and assigned a full-time security engineer to evaluate the security of the smart contract.
The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of this assessment is to:
Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended.
Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts.
In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were partially addressed by the AgentCoin TV team
:
Standardize all contracts to use the same Solidity version.
Upgrade to at least Solidity version 0.8.19 which has fixed these vulnerabilities.
Implement a time-delayed, multi-signature governance mechanism for emergency action.
Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy regarding the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance code coverage and quickly identify items that do not follow the security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used during the assessment:
Research into architecture and purpose.
Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough.
Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions. (solgraph
)
Manual assessment of use and safety for the critical Solidity variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes.
Manual testing by custom scripts.
Scanning of solidity files for vulnerabilities, security hot-spots or bugs. (MythX
)
Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions. (Slither
)
Testnet deployment. (Brownie
, Anvil
, Foundry
)
EXPLOITABILIY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
---|---|---|
Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
---|---|---|
Confidentiality (C) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
---|---|---|
Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
Severity | Score Value Range |
---|---|
Critical | 9 - 10 |
High | 7 - 8.9 |
Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
Low | 2 - 4.4 |
Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
3
Informational
1
Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
---|---|---|
Centralization Risk: Single Account Controls Contract Stop and Reserve Withdrawal | Low | Solved - 11/11/2024 |
Use of Deprecated and Vulnerable Solidity Version 0.5.17 | Low | Risk Accepted - 11/10/2024 |
Solidity Version Mismatch Between Core Contract and Dependencies | Low | Risk Accepted - 11/11/2024 |
Initialization Pattern Inconsistency in Proxy Context | Informational | Risk Accepted - 11/11/2024 |
// Low
The stopAndTransferReserve
function in AgentKey.sol allows the beneficiary address to unilaterally stop the contract and drain all reserves without any time delay, multi-signature requirement, or governance approval:
function stopAndTransferReserve(address payable _recipient) external {
require(msg.sender == beneficiary, "BENEFICIARY_ONLY");
isStopped = true;
Address.sendValue(_recipient, address(this).balance);
}
The beneficiary has the power to:
Stop all contract operations by setting isStopped = true
Immediately withdraw 100% of the contract's ETH balance
Execute both actions in a single atomic transaction
Send funds to any arbitrary address
This centralized control creates a systemic risk to the protocol as a single compromised key or malicious action leads to complete fund loss and permanent contract shutdown
Implement a time-delayed, multi-signature governance mechanism for emergency action.
SOLVED: The owner of the contract will be the DAO's address, which mitigates the risk of a single EOA having this level of control.
// Low
The AgentKey.sol contract is compiled using Solidity version 0.5.17
:
// SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED
pragma solidity 0.5.17;
This version contains multiple known vulnerabilities including:
AbiReencodingHeadOverflowWithStaticArrayCleanup
(SOL-2022-6): When ABI-encoding tuples with statically-sized calldata arrays, it corrupts 32 leading bytes of dynamically encoded components.
NestedCalldataArrayAbiReencodingSizeValidation
(SOL-2022-2): ABI-reencoding of nested dynamic calldata arrays does not perform proper size checks against calldata size and reads beyond calldatasize().
ABIDecodeTwoDimensionalArrayMemory
(SOL-2021-2): The ABI decoder does not properly validate pointers for dynamically-sized data when decoding from memory, leading to incorrect results.
DynamicArrayCleanup
(SOL-2020-10): Storage slots are not properly zeroed out when assigning dynamically-sized arrays with types <= 16 bytes.
The vulnerabilities in Solidity 0.5.17 affect core language features like ABI encoding/decoding and array handling. This exposes the contract to memory corruption, invalid data reading, and improper storage cleanup - compromising the reliability and security of core contract functionality.
Upgrade to at least Solidity version 0.8.19
which has fixed these vulnerabilities and includes additional safety features like:
Built-in overflow checks
More restrictive type casting
Improved error handling
Explicit mutability requirements
RISK ACCEPTED: Due to the fact that not major risk from 0.5.17 are present in the code, AgentCoin
team decided to not upgrade to a newer solidity version.
// Low
The AgentKey contract and its dependencies use different Solidity compiler versions which breaks version consistency across the protocol. The core contract uses Solidity 0.5.17
while its whitelist interface uses 0.8.13
:
solidity
Copy
// AgentKey.sol
pragma solidity 0.5.17;
import {DecentralizedAutonomousTrust} from "@fairmint/contracts/DecentralizedAutonomousTrust.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts-ethereum-package/contracts/utils/Address.sol";
// AgentKeyWhitelist.sol
pragma solidity ^0.8.13;
contract AgentKeyWhitelist {
function authorizeTransfer(address _from, address _to, uint256, bool) external pure {
require(_from == address(0) || _to == address(0), "TRANSFERS_DISABLED");
}
}
Impact :
Inconsistencies in type handling between compiler versions
Breaking changes in internal compiler behaviors between 0.5.x
and 0.8.x
Different security checks and optimizations applied across contract components
Standardize all contracts to use the same Solidity version.
RISK ACCEPTED: Due to the fact that not major risk from 0.5.17
are present in the code, AgentCoin
team decided to not upgrade to a newer solidity version.
// Informational
The AgentKey contract uses a constructor for initialization
while inheriting from an initializable
contract (DecentralizedAutonomousTrust). This creates inconsistency in the initialization pattern when used with proxy contracts.
// AgentKey.sol
contract AgentKey is DecentralizedAutonomousTrust {
constructor(
uint256 _initReserve,
address _currencyAddress,
uint256 _initGoal,
uint256 _buySlopeNum,
uint256 _buySlopeDen,
uint256 _investmentReserveBasisPoints,
uint256 _setupFee,
address payable _setupFeeRecipient,
string memory _name,
string memory _symbol
) public {
initialize(
_initReserve,
_currencyAddress,
_initGoal,
_buySlopeNum,
_buySlopeDen,
_investmentReserveBasisPoints,
_setupFee,
_setupFeeRecipient,
_name,
_symbol
);
}
}
// DecentralizedAutonomousTrust.sol
function initialize(
uint _initReserve,
address _currencyAddress,
...
) public {
// Initialize logic
}
Impact :
Incorrect initialization sequence when deployed behind a proxy
Constructor code not included in the deployed proxy implementation
Broken initialization pattern inheritance chain
Convert the constructor to an initializer function:
contract AgentKey is DecentralizedAutonomousTrust {
/// @custom:oz-upgrades-unsafe-allow constructor
constructor() initializer {}
function initialize(
uint256 _initReserve,
address _currencyAddress,
uint256 _initGoal,
uint256 _buySlopeNum,
uint256 _buySlopeDen,
uint256 _investmentReserveBasisPoints,
uint256 _setupFee,
address payable _setupFeeRecipient,
string memory _name,
string memory _symbol
) public initializer {
super.initialize(
_initReserve,
_currencyAddress,
_initGoal,
_buySlopeNum,
_buySlopeDen,
_investmentReserveBasisPoints,
_setupFee,
_setupFeeRecipient,
_name,
_symbol
);
}
}
RISK ACCEPTED: No upgradability will be used because AgentCoin
team decided not to change the current code.
Halborn used automated testing techniques to enhance the coverage of certain areas of the smart contracts in scope. Among the tools used was Slither, a Solidity static analysis framework.
After Halborn verified the smart contracts in the repository and was able to compile them correctly into their abis and binary format, Slither was run against the contracts. This tool can statically verify mathematical relationships between Solidity variables to detect invalid or inconsistent usage of the contracts' APIs across the entire code-base.
All issues identified by Slither
were proved to be false positives or have been added to the issue list in this report.
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
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