Desktop Wallet - Anatha

During the assessment, we have identified that the Anatha Desktop Wallet leaks Mnemonic Phrases for wallets that belong to the Anatha Organization. The Mnemonic Phrases are leaked in the [Installation Folder]/resources/app.asar file. Any attacker who installs the Anatha Desktop Wallet can retrieve these Mnemonics and use them to access the wallet to transfer tokens out of it into their wallets. There are three such leaked Mnemonic Phrases, possibly used by Anatha for testing purposes, or to distribute tokens/rewards to their clients' wallets.

Code Location

These are the locations in the codebase where the Mnemonic Phrases exist, and which must be removed before deployment:

platform/common/src/clients/anatha/fixtures/keys.ts

const m1 = [
  'fragile',
  'duck',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  'fun',
  'account',
].join(' ');

const m2 = [
  'puppy',
  'coil',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  'stomach',
  'rent'
].join(' ');

platform/common/src/clients/anatha/tests/keypair.test.ts

const mnemonic = [
  'fragile',
  'duck',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  'fun',
  'account',
].join(' ');

platform/common/src/clients/bch/tests/keypair.test.js

const mnemonic = [
  'fragile',
  'duck',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  'fun',
  'account',
].join(' ');

platform/common/src/clients/bnb/tests/keypair.test.js

const mnemonic = [
  'fragile',
  'duck',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  'fun',
  'account',
].join(' ');

platform/common/src/clients/btc/tests/keypair.test.js

const mnemonic = [
  'fragile',
  'duck',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  'fun',
  'account',
].join(' ');

platform/common/src/clients/dash/tests/keypair.test.js

const mnemonic = [
  'fragile',
  'duck',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  'fun',
  'account',
].join(' ');

platform/common/src/clients/xrp/tests/keypair.test.js

const mnemonic1 = [
  'fragile',
  'duck',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  'fun',
  'account',
].join(' ');

const mnemonic2 = [
  'armed',
  'bundle',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  'pumpkin',
  'athlete',
].join(' ');

platform/common/src/clients/cosmos/tests/keypair.test.js

const mnemonic2 = [
  'armed',
  'bundle',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  '*****',
  'pumpkin',
  'athlete',
].join(' ');

During the assessment, we have identified that the Anatha Desktop Wallet leaks private keys for wallets that belong to the Anatha Organization. The private keys in the [Installation Folder]/resources/app.asar file. Any attacker who installs the Anatha Desktop Wallet can retrieve the keys and use them to perform transaction on the respective wallets. There are five such leaked private keys.

Code Location

These are the locations in the codebase where the Private Keys exist, and which must be removed before deployment:

platform/common/src/clients/anatha/fixtures/keys.ts

const addr1 = 'anatha1rugv0xeflk2zrj46dnwl89nx92k8z7jm66wmy9';
const addr2 = 'anatha1s0jfgrwsh0ccpw3u04h4c3u2th7xesrptlpy79';

const priv1 = '453268f9acf09be***************607b4ffbd4b8483c9674e';
const priv2 = '6b8a64f5b2c730d***************5ac10c39c10db58b5b7c0';

platform/common/src/clients/web3/fixtures/keys.ts

const priv1 =
  '7fb2eac5245d140e0f8d1***************fa0a256dfcdd60dad997fd353b5f';
const priv2 =
  '00e0f8adb0a022de08ef3***************07b7898c9f02b95ccc6ffdbfe9fc';
const priv3 =
  '4b64874042478e82b3db8***************3326e6b371285d5e6fb3e3ca94b5';

The Mnemonic Phrase in the wallet is not encrypted in memory. As a result, an attacker who has compromised a user’s machine can exfiltrate and steal their Mnemonic Phrase.

The Mnemonic Phrase is leaked into memory after the creation of a wallet, the unlocking of the wallet (using password or seed phrase) and the import of the wallet using the seed phrase

We have identified that, It is possible to bypass PIN mechanism and get the seed phrase of wallet, which can lead to takeover of user wallet. We observed that by just crossing the PIN window can bypass this mechanism and perform privilege actions like getting the seed phrase of user's wallet.

Loom Video: PIN Mechanism Bypass

The application fetches translations for various messages in various languages from a Google Doc which is world-writable. The Google Doc URL is in plaintext and can be retrieved from the app.asar file of the installed application. A malicious actor can edit this document to anything they want and the next time developer runs npm run locale import all they will get the malicious changes.

Loom Video: Unauthenticated changes of the locales

Context isolation is an Electron feature that allows developers to run code in preload scripts and in Electron APIs in a dedicated JavaScript context. Even when nodeIntegration: false is used, to truly enforce strong isolation and prevent the use of Node primitives contextIsolation must also be used.

If contextIsolation is not used, malicious JS code can tamper with JavaScript native functions as well as preload script code via prototype pollution.

Code Location

/wallet-desktop/app/main.dev.js

      webPreferences: {
      nodeIntegration: true,
      nodeIntegrationInWorker: true,
      enableRemoteModule: true,
      contextIsolation: false,
      devTools: IS_DEV_QA_MODE,
    },
  });

In Electron, nodeIntegration is a boolean option that can be used to determine whether node integration is enabled, allows JavaScript to leverage Node.js primitives and modules.

As a result, this could lead to full remote system compromise if you are rendering untrusted content.

For instance, a remote untrusted domain rendered in a browser window could invoke Node.js APIs to execute native code on the user’s machine. Similarly, a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability on a website can lead to remote code execution.

Code Location

/wallet-desktop/app/main.dev.js

      webPreferences: {
      nodeIntegration: true,
      nodeIntegrationInWorker: true,
      enableRemoteModule: true,
      contextIsolation: false,
      devTools: IS_DEV_QA_MODE,
    },
  });

The Anatha Desktop Wallet application uses a third-party dependency to delegate handling of program arguments. However, the dependency creates an expected disadvantage in that the actual application's security posture now rests on it.

Specifically, the axios <=0.21.1 package suffers from a high vulnerability, the elliptic<=6.5.3 package suffers from a high vulnerability, the follow-redirects<=1.14.7 suffers from a high vulnerability, the lodash<=4.17.20 package suffers from a critical vulnerability and the node-notifier<8.0.1 suffers from a medium vulnerability.

Code Location

The output of 'npm audit'

axios  <=0.21.1
Severity: high
Incorrect Comparison in axios - https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cph5-m8f7-6c5x
Server-Side Request Forgery in Axios - https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4w2v-q235-vp99
Depends on vulnerable versions of follow-redirects
No fix available
node_modules/axios
  @binance-chain/javascript-sdk  *
  Depends on vulnerable versions of axios
  node_modules/@binance-chain/javascript-sdk

elliptic  <=6.5.3
Severity: high
Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm - https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r9p9-mrjm-926w
Signature Malleabillity in elliptic - https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vh7m-p724-62c2
fix available via `npm audit fix --force`
Will install @dashevo/dashcore-lib@0.18.15, which is a breaking change
node_modules/@dashevo/dashcore-lib/node_modules/elliptic
node_modules/bitcore-lib-cash/node_modules/elliptic
node_modules/bitcore-lib/node_modules/elliptic
node_modules/litecore-lib/node_modules/elliptic
  @dashevo/dashcore-lib  <=0.18.11 || >=0.19.0
  Depends on vulnerable versions of elliptic
  node_modules/@dashevo/dashcore-lib

follow-redirects  <=1.14.7
Severity: high
Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor in follow-redirects - https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pw2r-vq6v-hr8c
Exposure of sensitive information in follow-redirects - https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-74fj-2j2h-c42q
No fix available
node_modules/follow-redirects
  axios  <=0.21.1
  Depends on vulnerable versions of follow-redirects
  node_modules/axios
    @binance-chain/javascript-sdk  *
    Depends on vulnerable versions of axios
    node_modules/@binance-chain/javascript-sdk

lodash  <=4.17.20
Severity: critical
Prototype Pollution in lodash - https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jf85-cpcp-j695
Prototype Pollution in lodash - https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fvqr-27wr-82fm
Prototype Pollution in lodash - https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p6mc-m468-83gw
Command Injection in lodash - https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-35jh-r3h4-6jhm
Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in lodash - https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x5rq-j2xg-h7qm
fix available via `npm audit fix --force`
Will install bitcore-lib-cash@8.25.25, which is outside the stated dependency range
node_modules/bitcore-lib-cash/node_modules/lodash
node_modules/bitcore-lib/node_modules/lodash
node_modules/litecore-lib/node_modules/lodash
  bitcore-lib  <=8.22.1 || >=9.0.0
  Depends on vulnerable versions of lodash
  node_modules/bitcore-lib
  bitcore-lib-cash  <=8.22.1 || >=9.0.0
  Depends on vulnerable versions of lodash
  node_modules/bitcore-lib-cash
  litecore-lib  *
  Depends on vulnerable versions of lodash
  node_modules/litecore-lib

node-notifier  <8.0.1
Severity: moderate
OS Command Injection in node-notifier - https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5fw9-fq32-wv5p
fix available via `npm audit fix --force`
Will install jest@27.5.1, which is a breaking change
node_modules/node-notifier
  @jest/reporters  <=26.4.0
  Depends on vulnerable versions of node-notifier
  node_modules/@jest/reporters
    @jest/core  <=25.5.4
    Depends on vulnerable versions of @jest/reporters
    node_modules/@jest/core
      jest-cli  24.2.0-alpha.0 - 25.5.4
      Depends on vulnerable versions of @jest/core
      node_modules/jest-cli
        jest  24.2.0-alpha.0 - 25.5.4
        Depends on vulnerable versions of jest-cli
        node_modules/jest

/platform/common/package.json

"main": "dist/index.js",
"module": "dist/index.esm.js",
"types": "types/index.d.ts",
"dependencies": {
  "@binance-chain/javascript-sdk": "^2.16.2",
  "@cosmjs/proto-signing": "^0.24.1",
  "@cosmjs/stargate": "^0.24.1",
  "@dashevo/dashcore-lib": "=0.17.0",
  "anatha-sdk": "git+ssh://git@github.com/anathatech/anatha-sdk.git#011659ccd94b53d288f261d49dd54841d7dff2b9",
  "axios": "^0.19.2",

platform/common/package.json

"create-hash": "^1.2.0",
"elliptic": "^6.5.4",
"ethereumjs-tx": "^2.1.1",

platform/common/package-lock.json

"follow-redirects": {
  "version": "1.14.9",
  "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/follow-redirects/-/follow-redirects-1.14.9.tgz",
  "integrity": "sha512-MQDfihBQYMcyy5dhRDJUHcw7lb2Pv/TuE6xP1vyraLukNDHKbDxDNaOE3NbCAdKQApno+GPRyo1YAp89yCjK4w=="
}

platform/common/package.json

"litecore-lib": "^0.13.22",
"lodash": "^4.17.21",
"moment": "^2.27.0",

API requests consume resources such as network, CPU, memory, and storage. This vulnerability occurs when too many requests arrive simultaneously and the API does not have enough compute resources to handle those requests. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to overload the https://wallet-backend.mainnet.anatha.net/api/v1 API by sending more requests than it can handle. As a result, the API becomes unavailable or unresponsive to new requests, and there can be a depletion of third-party API tokens.

The remote module provides a way for the renderer processes to access APIs normally only available in the main process. Using it, a renderer can invoke methods of a main process object without explicitly sending inter-process messages. This is highly discouraged since the module is considered harmful.

remote uses an internal IPC channel to communicate with the main process. "Prototype pollution" attacks can grant malicious code access to the internal IPC channel, which can then be used to escape the sandbox by mimicking remote IPC messages and getting access to main process modules running with higher privileges.

Code Location

/wallet-desktop/app/main.dev.js

      webPreferences: {
      nodeIntegration: true,
      nodeIntegrationInWorker: true,
      enableRemoteModule: true,
      contextIsolation: false,
      devTools: IS_DEV_QA_MODE,
    },
  });

We have discovered that the backend API server with which the Anatha Desktop Wallet communicates, generates an error message that includes sensitive information about its environment, users, or associated data.

Specifically, the error shows directory structure, OS, and JS packages used.

This is the HTTP Request/Response that produces the error:

POST /api/v1/auth HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Content-Type: application/json;charset=utf-8
User-Agent: axios/0.19.2
Content-Length: 486
Host: wallet-backend.mainnet.anatha.net
Connection: close

{"data":{"challenge":"12345'"\'\");|]*%00{%0d%0a<%00>%bf%27'####"},"public_key":"022459a933b8b88bdb8029a9e5c7730a7d41c2ac4507e2be7889f2ba88ddc520a3","signature":"7..."}

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Server: nginx/1.16.1
Date: Wed, 25 May 2022 07:18:13 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 1016
Connection: close
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'
X-DNS-Prefetch-Control: off
Expect-CT: max-age=0
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=15552000; includeSubDomains
X-Download-Options: noopen
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies: none
Referrer-Policy: no-referrer
X-XSS-Protection: 0

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<title>Error</title>
</head>
<body>
<pre>SyntaxError: Unexpected token \ in JSON at position 29<br> &nbsp; &nbsp;at JSON.parse (&lt;anonymous&gt;)<br> &nbsp; &nbsp;at parse (/home/centos/wallet-backend/node_modules/body-parser/lib/types/json.js:89:19)<br> &nbsp; &nbsp;at /home/centos/wallet-backend/node_modules/body-parser/lib/read.js:121:18<br> &nbsp; &nbsp;at invokeCallback (/home/centos/wallet-backend/node_modules/raw-body/index.js:224:16)<br> &nbsp; &nbsp;at done (/home/centos/wallet-backend/node_modules/raw-body/index.js:213:7)<br> &nbsp; &nbsp;at IncomingMessage.onEnd (/home/centos/wallet-backend/node_modules/raw-body/index.js:273:7)<br> &nbsp; &nbsp;at IncomingMessage.emit (events.js:314:20)<br> &nbsp; &nbsp;at IncomingMessage.EventEmitter.emit (domain.js:483:12)<br> &nbsp; &nbsp;at endReadableNT (_stream_readable.js:1241:12)<br> &nbsp; &nbsp;at processTicksAndRejections (internal/process/task_queues.js:84:21)</pre>
</body>
</html>

When creating an account on the Anatha Desktop Wallet, the application doesn't ask the user to validate that they have written down the correct seed phrase. This can lead to loss of funds if, for any reason, the user has written down the wrong Seed Phrase. We have also identified that, It was possible to create a Wallet account with any random alphabets. Moreover, there were no checks on the length of the seed phrase as well.