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L1 - Artela


Prepared by:

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HALBORN

Last Updated 10/24/2024

Date of Engagement by: August 5th, 2024 - August 26th, 2024

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

4

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

2

Low

1

Informational

1


1. Introduction

Artela engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their halo module, beginning on Halborn to conduct a security assessment on the appchain modules, beginning on 08/05/2024 and ending on 08/26/2024. The security assessment was scoped to the sections of code that pertain to the modules. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.

2. Assessment Summary

Halborn was provided 3 weeks for the engagement and assigned 1 full-time security engineer to review the security of the smart contracts in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security experts with advanced penetration testing and smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of the assessment is to:

- Ensure that the Artela Chain Modules operate as intended.

- Identify potential security issues with the Artela Chain Modules in the Artela Chain.

In summary, Halborn identified some security concerns that were mostly addressed by the Artela team.

3. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the custom modules. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of structures and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:

- Research into architecture and purpose.

- Static Analysis of security for scoped repository, and imported functions. (e.g., staticcheck, gosec, unconvert, codeql, ineffassign and semgrep)

- Manual Assessment for discovering security vulnerabilities in the codebase.

- Ensuring the correctness of the codebase.

- Dynamic Analysis of files and modules related to the modules.


4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_e)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)
1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EE is calculated using the following formula:

E=meE = \prod m_e

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_I)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact II is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+mImax(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)
1
0.5
0.25
Scope (ss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)
1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

Files and Repository
(a) Repository: artela
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 5d73109
(c) Items in scope:
    Out-of-Scope:
    Files and Repository
    (a) Repository: artela
    (b) Assessed Commit ID: 0de8619
    (c) Items in scope:
      Out-of-Scope:
      Remediation Commit ID:
      Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

      6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

      Critical

      0

      High

      0

      Medium

      2

      Low

      1

      Informational

      1

      Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
      Lack Of Eth Rpc Support On Artela ChainMediumSolved - 08/29/2024
      Incorrect Gas Used Calculation In Transaction ReceiptMediumSolved - 08/29/2024
      Docker image running as rootLowRisk Accepted
      The HTTP/2 protocol in Golang 1.21.5 is susceptible to DoS attacksInformationalAcknowledged

      7. Findings & Tech Details

      7.1 Lack Of Eth Rpc Support On Artela Chain

      // Medium

      Description

      The Artela chain currently does not support standard Ethereum (ETH) RPC calls. This limitation significantly impacts the chain's compatibility with existing Ethereum tools, libraries, and dApps.

      1. Reduced Developer Adoption: Ethereum developers face barriers in porting their existing applications to Artela, potentially slowing ecosystem growth.

      2. Limited Tool Compatibility: Popular Ethereum development tools, wallets, and explorers may not function correctly with Artela.


      - web3_clientVersion
      - debug_storageRangeAt
      - eth_maxPriorityFeePerGas
      - eth_getRawTransactionByHash
      - eth_fillTransaction
      - eth_pendingTransactions
      - eth_coinbase
      - eth_resend
      - debug_traceTransaction
      - debug_traceCall
      - trace_call
      BVSS
      Recommendation

      To address this issue and improve Artela's compatibility with the Ethereum ecosystem, we recommend the following actions:

      1. Implement ETH RPC Compatibility Layer:

      - Develop a compatibility layer that translates standard Ethereum RPC calls to their Artela equivalents.

      - Prioritize implementing the most commonly used RPC methods first, such as eth_getBalance, eth_sendTransaction, and eth_call.

      Remediation

      SOLVED: The Artela team solved the issue by adding RPC calls.

      Remediation Hash

      7.2 Incorrect Gas Used Calculation In Transaction Receipt

      // Medium

      Description

      In the GetTransactionReceipt function, the gasUsed field of the transaction receipt is incorrectly set to the gas limit of the transaction (`txData.GetGas()`) instead of the actual gas used by the transaction (`res.GasUsed`).

      Current implementation:

      "gasUsed": hexutil.Uint64(txData.GetGas())
      BVSS
      Recommendation

      Replace txData.GetGas() with res.GasUsed in the gasUsed field assignment.

      Remediation

      SOLVED: The Artela team solved the issue by implementing the suggested recommendation.

      Remediation Hash
      References

      7.3 Docker image running as root

      // Low

      Description

      Docker containers generally run with root privileges by default. This allows for unrestricted container management, meaning a user could install system packages, edit configuration files, bind privileged ports, etc. During static analysis, it was observed that the docker image is maintained through the root user.


      FROM golang:1.21.5-bullseye as build-env
      
      # Install minimum necessary dependencies
      ENV PACKAGES curl make git libc-dev bash gcc
      RUN apt-get update && apt-get upgrade -y && \
          apt-get install -y $PACKAGES
      
      # Set working directory for the source copy
      WORKDIR /go/src/github.com/artela-network
      
      # Add source files
      COPY ./artela ./artela
      
      # Reset the working directory for the build
      WORKDIR /go/src/github.com/artela-network/artela
      
      # disable optimisation and strip for remote debugging
      ENV COSMOS_BUILD_OPTIONS "nostrip,nooptimization"
      
      # build artelad
      RUN make build
      
      # Final image
      FROM golang:1.21.5-bullseye as final
      
      WORKDIR /
      
      RUN apt-get update && \
          go install github.com/go-delve/delve/cmd/dlv@latest
      
      # Add GO Bin to PATH
      ENV PATH "/go/bin:${PATH}"
      
      # Copy over binaries from the build-env
      COPY --from=build-env /go/src/github.com/artela-network/artela/build/artelad /
      COPY --from=build-env /go/src/github.com/artela-network/artela/scripts/start-artela.sh /
      
      EXPOSE 26656 26657 1317 9090 8545 8546 19211
      
      # Run artelad by default, omit entrypoint to ease using container with artelad
      ENTRYPOINT ["/bin/bash", "-c"]
      BVSS
      Recommendation

      To mitigate this issue, it is recommended to follow the principle of least privilege and run the container as a non-root user. This can be achieved by creating a dedicated user within the Dockerfile and running the application as that user.

      Remediation

      RISK ACCEPTED: The Artela team accepted the risk of the issue.

      References

      7.4 The HTTP/2 protocol in Golang 1.21.5 is susceptible to DoS attacks

      // Informational

      Description

      A vulnerability was discovered with the implementation of the HTTP/2 protocol in Golang prior to 1.21.9 and 1.22.2 versions. The current version used in app chain is 1.21.

      An attacker can cause the HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data by sending an excessive number of CONTINUATION frames. This causes excessive CPU consumption of the receiver device since there is no sufficient limitation on the amount of frames. Thus, It could be exploited to cause DoS.

      Please note that, many HTTP/2 implementations (including Golang) did not properly limit the amount of CONTINUATION frames within a single stream.

      References:

      https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/421644

      https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-45288

      Score
      Impact:
      Likelihood:
      Recommendation

      The issue is fixed in both Golang 1.21.9 and 1.22.2. However, If you are intending to use 1.21.X, It is recommended upgrading to 1.21.11 (the latest of 1.21.X) since it has some other security/bug fixes in net/http package.

      Remediation

      ACKNOWLEDGED: The Artela team acknowledged the issue.

      Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

      © Halborn 2024. All rights reserved.