Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated 04/26/2024
Date of Engagement by: February 9th, 2022 - March 25th, 2022
0% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
11
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
0
Informational
11
Aurora engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on the staking farm NEAR smart contracts utilized by them, beginning on February 9th, 2022 and ending March 25th, 2022. Aurora provides Ethereum compatibility, NEAR Protocol scalability, and industry-first user experience through affordable transactions.
Though this security audit's outcome is satisfactory, only the most essential aspects were tested and verified to achieve objectives and deliverables set in the scope due to time and resource constraints. It is essential to note the use of the best practices for secure development.
The team at Halborn was provided 6 weeks for the engagement and assigned two full-time security engineers to audit the security of the assets in scope. The engineers are blockchain and smart contract security experts with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of this audit is to achieve the following:
Identify potential security issues within the NEAR smart contracts.
In summary, Halborn identified few security risks that were mostly addressed by the Aurora team.
Halborn performed a combination of manual view of the code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the smart contract audit. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of smart contracts and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the audit:
Research into architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.
Manual code read and walkthrough.
Manual Assessment of use and safety for the critical Rust variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes.
Fuzz testing. (cargo fuzz, honggfuzz)
Checking the unsafe code usage. (cargo-geiger)
Scanning of Rust files for vulnerabilities.(cargo audit)
Deployment to devnet through near-cli
| EXPLOITABILIY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
| Severity | Score Value Range |
|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 |
| High | 7 - 8.9 |
| Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
| Low | 2 - 4.4 |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
0
Informational
11
| Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
|---|---|---|
| HAL01 - PUBLICLY CALLABLE FUNCTIONS LEADING TO OUT-OF-CONTRACT FUNDS BURN | Informational | - |
| HAL02 - IMPROPER ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL POLICY | Informational | - |
| HAL03 - MULTIPLE STAKING ACTIONS CAN BE PERFORMED WHILE CONTRACT IS PAUSED | Informational | - |
| HAL04 - LACK OF VALIDATION OF BURN FRACTION | Informational | - |
| HAL05 - VALUE CONVERSION TO SMALLER SIZES MAY RESULT IN OVERFLOWS | Informational | - |
| HAL06 - DELEGATOR AND PREDECESSOR CAN BE THE SAME | Informational | - |
| HAL07 - USE OF VULNERABLE CRATES | Informational | - |
| HAL08 - DEPOSIT ATTACHED IS NOT ASSERTED | Informational | - |
| HAL09 - REDUNDANT ASSERTION | Informational | - |
| HAL10 - ASSERTION SHOULD BE REPLACED BY A MACRO | Informational | - |
| HAL11 - DEFAULT IMPLEMENTATION SHOULD BE REPLACED BY A MACRO | Informational | - |
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Halborn used automated security scanners to assist with detection of well-known security issues and vulnerabilities. Among the tools used was cargo audit, a security scanner for vulnerabilities reported to the RustSec Advisory Database. All vulnerabilities published in https://crates.io are stored in a repository named The RustSec Advisory Database. cargo audit is a human-readable version of the advisory database which performs a scanning on Cargo.lock. Security Detections are only in scope. All vulnerabilities shown here were already disclosed in the above report. However, to better assist the developers maintaining this code, the auditors are including the output with the dependencies tree, and this is included in the cargo audit output to better know the dependencies affected by unmaintained and vulnerable crates.
\begin{center} \begin{tabular}{|l|p{2cm}|p{9cm}|} \hline \textbf{ID} & \textbf{package} & \textbf{Short Description} \ \hline \href{https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2020-0159}{RUSTSEC-2020-0159} & chrono & Potential segfault in localtime\textunderscore r invocations \ \hline \href{https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2021-0067}{RUSTSEC-2021-0067} & cranelift-codegen & Memory access due to code generation flaw in Cranelift module\ \hline \href{https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2021-0013}{RUSTSEC-2021-0013} & raw-cpuid & Soundness issues in raw-cpuid \ \hline \href{https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2021-0089}{RUSTSEC-2021-0089} & raw-cpuid & Optional Deserialize implementations lacking validation \ \hline \href{https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2022-0013}{RUSTSEC-2022-0013} & regex & Regexes with large repetitions on empty sub-expressions take a very long time to parse \ \hline \href{https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2020-0071}{RUSTSEC-2020-0071} & time & Potential segfault in the time crate \ \hline \href{https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2021-0110}{RUSTSEC-2021-0110} & wasmtime & Multiple Vulnerabilities in Wasmtime \ \hline \end{tabular} \end{center}
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
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