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deBridge Core Protocol Solana Contracts - deBridge


Prepared by:

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HALBORN

Last Updated 11/15/2024

Date of Engagement by: September 16th, 2024 - October 7th, 2024

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

1

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

0

Informational

1


1. Introduction

deBridge team engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their debridge and settings programs beginning on September 16th, 2024 and ending on October 7th, 2024. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided in the GitHub repositories solana-contracts. Commit hashes, and further details, can be found in the Scope section of this report.

deBridge is releasing a new version of debridge and settings, that includes new implementations for the different instructions necessary to coordinate token orders across different blockchains.

2. Assessment Summary

Halborn was provided 1,5 weeks for the engagement and assigned one full-time security engineer to review the security of the Solana Program in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of the assessment is to:

    • Identify potential security issues within the codebase.

    • Check that the codebase does not have any known vulnerability that might affect the participants' funds

    • Validate that the implemented changes do not affect the asynchronous nature and cross chain liquidity capabilities of the DLN network.

In summary, Halborn identified one improvement to reduce the likelihood and impact of multiple risks, which has been acknowledged by the deBridge team. It was the following:

    • Lack of documentation on new functions

3. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn performed a combination of a manual review of the source code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the program assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in business logic, processes, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of programs and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.

The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:

    • Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the token airdrop program.

    • Manual program source code review to identify business logic issues.

    • Mapping out possible attack vectors

    • Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Rust variables and functions in scope that could lead to arithmetic vulnerabilities.

    • Scanning dependencies for known vulnerabilities (cargo audit).

4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILIY METRIC (mem_e)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)
1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EE is calculated using the following formula:

E=meE = \prod m_e

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_I)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact II is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+mImax(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)
1
0.5
0.25
Scope (ss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)
1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

Files and Repository
(a) Repository: solana-contracts
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 97c5dbb
(c) Items in scope:
  • crates/client/src/client/settings_client.rs
  • crates/client/src/settings_instructions_builder.rs
  • programs/debridge/Cargo.toml
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope:
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

0

Informational

1

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Lack of documentation on new functionsInformationalAcknowledged - 11/14/2024

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Lack of documentation on new functions

// Informational

Description

Several newly added functions lacks an accompanying documentation. Proper documentation is essential in development, as it provides crucial context about the function’s purpose, parameters, return values, and expected behavior. Without documentation, developers and maintainers may struggle to understand the function’s intent, leading to potential misuses, maintenance challenges, and increased onboarding time for new team members.

The mentioned functions are:

  • update_mint_bridge_token_names in crates/client/src/client/settings_client.rs in line 1335

  • new_update_mint_bridge_token_names in crates/client/src/settings_instructions_builder.rs in line 1049

  • update_mint_bridge_token_names in programs/settings/src/lib.rs in line1659


Which can be seen in the snippets below:


settings_client.rs

#[async_trait]
pub trait UpdateMintBridgeTokenNames: SendTransactionBy<Role> {
    async fn update_mint_bridge_token_names(
        &self,
        token_mint: Pubkey,
        name: String,
        symbol: String,
    ) -> Result<Signature, Error> {
        self.send_by(
            &[Role::ProtocolAuthority],
            &[Instruction::new_update_mint_bridge_token_names(
                self.get_role_pubkey(Role::ProtocolAuthority)
                    .ok_or_else(|| {
                        Error::NotEnoughAuthorization(Role::ProtocolAuthority.to_string())
                    })?,
                token_mint,
                name,
                symbol,
            )],
        )
        .await
    }
}
impl<C: SendTransactionBy<Role>> UpdateMintBridgeTokenNames for C {}

settings_instructions_builder.rs

pub trait NewUpdateMintBridgeTokenNames {
    fn new_update_mint_bridge_token_names(
        protocol_authority: Pubkey,
        token_mint: Pubkey,
        new_name: String,
        new_symbol: String,
    ) -> Instruction {
        Instruction::new_with_bytes(
            settings::ID,
            &settings::instruction::UpdateMintBridgeTokenNames {
                new_name,
                new_symbol,
            }
            .data(),
            settings::accounts::UpdateMintBridgeTokenMetadata {
                update_bridge: settings::accounts::UpdateBridge {
                    state: *STATE_PUBKEY,
                    protocol_authority,
                    bridge_data: Pubkey::find_bridge_address(&token_mint).0,
                    token_mint,
                    token_program: token::ID,
                },
                token_metadata: token_metadata::pda::find_metadata_account(&token_mint).0,
                token_metadata_program: token_metadata::ID,
                token_metadata_master: Pubkey::find_token_metadata_master_address().0,
            }
            .to_account_metas(None),
        )
    }
}
impl NewUpdateMintBridgeTokenNames for Instruction {}


lib.rs

    pub fn update_mint_bridge_token_names(
        ctx: Context<UpdateMintBridgeTokenMetadata>,
        new_name: String,
        new_symbol: String,
    ) -> Result<()> {
        let token_metadata::state::Metadata {
            data:
                token_metadata::state::Data {
                    uri,
                    seller_fee_basis_points,
                    creators,
                    ..
                },
            ..
        } = token_metadata::state::Metadata::from_account_info(&ctx.accounts.token_metadata)?; // todo compute offset, only serialize necessary data

        invoke_signed(
            &token_metadata::instruction::update_metadata_accounts_v2(
                token_metadata::ID,
                ctx.accounts.token_metadata.key(),
                ctx.accounts.update_bridge.bridge_data.key(),
                None,
                Some(TokenMetadata {
                    name: new_name,
                    symbol: new_symbol,
                    seller_fee_basis_points,
                    creators,
                    uri,
                    collection: None,
                    uses: None,
                }),
                None,
                None,
            ),
            &[
                ctx.accounts.token_metadata.to_account_info(),
                ctx.accounts.update_bridge.bridge_data.to_account_info(),
            ],
            &[&[
                Bridge::SEED,
                ctx.accounts.update_bridge.token_mint.key().as_ref(),
                &[ctx.accounts.update_bridge.bridge_data.bumps.bridge],
            ]],
        )?;
        Ok(())
    }


Documenting code is widely recognized as a best practice in software development, particularly for functions performing complex or business-critical tasks. Clear documentation:

• Enhances readability, allowing developers to quickly understand the function’s logic.

• Improves maintainability by reducing time spent deciphering undocumented code.

• Reduces the risk of introducing bugs, as developers can more easily identify the function’s intended behavior.

• Simplifies onboarding for new developers by providing clear guidance on existing code functionality.

Score
Recommendation

Consider adding inline documentation for each of the mentioned functions, detailing:

1. Function Purpose: A brief overview of what the function does.

2. Parameters: Descriptions of each parameter, including data types and expected values.

3. Return Values: Information on what the function returns and under what conditions.

4. Error Handling: Notes on potential errors or edge cases that the function may encounter.

Remediation

ACKNOWLEDGED: The deBridge team acknowledged this finding.

8. Automated Testing

Static Analysis Report
Description

Halborn used automated security scanners to assist with detection of well-known security issues and vulnerabilities. Among the tools used was cargo audit, a security scanner for vulnerabilities reported to the RustSec Advisory Database. All vulnerabilities published in https://crates.io are stored in a repository named The RustSec Advisory Database. cargo audit is a human-readable version of the advisory database which performs a scanning on Cargo.lock. Security Detections are only in scope. All vulnerabilities shown here were already disclosed in the above report. However, to better assist the developers maintaining this code, the auditors are including the output with the dependencies tree, and this is included in the cargo audit output to better know the dependencies affected by unmaintained and vulnerable crates.


Cargo Audit Results

ID

package

Short Description

RUSTSEC-2024-0344

curve25519-dalek

Timing variability in `curve25519-dalek`'s `Scalar29::sub`/`Scalar52::sub`

RUSTSEC-2022-0093

ed25519-dalek

Double Public Key Signing Function Oracle Attack on ed25519-dalek

RUSTSEC-2024-0332

h2

Degradation of service in h2 servers with CONTINUATION Flood

RUSTSEC-2024-0003

h2

Resource exhaustion vulnerability in h2 may lead to Denial of Service (DoS)

RUSTSEC-2024-0019

mio

Tokens for named pipes may be delivered after deregistration

RUSTSEC-2024-0357

openssl

MemBio::get_buf has undefined behavior with empty buffers

RUSTSEC-2023-0063

quinn-proto

Denial of service in Quinn servers

RUSTSEC-2024-0336

rustls

rustls::ConnectionCommon::complete_io could fall into an infinite loop based on network input

RUSTSEC-2024-0006

shlex

Multiple issues involving quote API

RUSTSEC-2020-0071

time

Potential segfault in the time crate

RUSTSEC-2023-0001

tokio

reject_remote_clients Configuration corruption

RUSTSEC-2023-0065

tungstenite

Tungstenite allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service

RUSTSEC-2023-0052

webpki

webpki: CPU denial of service in certificate path building

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

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