Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated 11/15/2024
Date of Engagement by: September 16th, 2024 - October 7th, 2024
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
1
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
0
Informational
1
deBridge
team engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their debridge
and settings
programs beginning on September 16th, 2024 and ending on October 7th, 2024. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided in the GitHub repositories solana-contracts. Commit hashes, and further details, can be found in the Scope section of this report.
deBridge
is releasing a new version of debridge
and settings
, that includes new implementations for the different instructions necessary to coordinate token orders across different blockchains.
Halborn
was provided 1,5 weeks for the engagement and assigned one full-time security engineer to review the security of the Solana Program in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of the assessment is to:
Identify potential security issues within the codebase.
Check that the codebase does not have any known vulnerability that might affect the participants' funds
Validate that the implemented changes do not affect the asynchronous nature and cross chain liquidity capabilities of the DLN network.
In summary, Halborn identified one improvement to reduce the likelihood and impact of multiple risks, which has been acknowledged by the deBridge team
. It was the following:
Lack of documentation on new functions
Halborn
performed a combination of a manual review of the source code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the program assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in business logic, processes, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of programs and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.
The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:
Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the token airdrop program.
Manual program source code review to identify business logic issues.
Mapping out possible attack vectors
Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Rust variables and functions in scope that could lead to arithmetic vulnerabilities.
Scanning dependencies for known vulnerabilities (cargo audit
).
EXPLOITABILIY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
---|---|---|
Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
---|---|---|
Confidentiality (C) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
---|---|---|
Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
Severity | Score Value Range |
---|---|
Critical | 9 - 10 |
High | 7 - 8.9 |
Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
Low | 2 - 4.4 |
Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
0
Informational
1
Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
---|---|---|
Lack of documentation on new functions | Informational | Acknowledged - 11/14/2024 |
// Informational
Several newly added functions lacks an accompanying documentation. Proper documentation is essential in development, as it provides crucial context about the function’s purpose, parameters, return values, and expected behavior. Without documentation, developers and maintainers may struggle to understand the function’s intent, leading to potential misuses, maintenance challenges, and increased onboarding time for new team members.
The mentioned functions are:
update_mint_bridge_token_names
in crates/client/src/client/settings_client.rs
in line 1335
new_update_mint_bridge_token_names
in crates/client/src/settings_instructions_builder.rs
in line 1049
update_mint_bridge_token_names
in programs/settings/src/lib.rs
in line1659
Which can be seen in the snippets below:
settings_client.rs
#[async_trait]
pub trait UpdateMintBridgeTokenNames: SendTransactionBy<Role> {
async fn update_mint_bridge_token_names(
&self,
token_mint: Pubkey,
name: String,
symbol: String,
) -> Result<Signature, Error> {
self.send_by(
&[Role::ProtocolAuthority],
&[Instruction::new_update_mint_bridge_token_names(
self.get_role_pubkey(Role::ProtocolAuthority)
.ok_or_else(|| {
Error::NotEnoughAuthorization(Role::ProtocolAuthority.to_string())
})?,
token_mint,
name,
symbol,
)],
)
.await
}
}
impl<C: SendTransactionBy<Role>> UpdateMintBridgeTokenNames for C {}
settings_instructions_builder.rs
pub trait NewUpdateMintBridgeTokenNames {
fn new_update_mint_bridge_token_names(
protocol_authority: Pubkey,
token_mint: Pubkey,
new_name: String,
new_symbol: String,
) -> Instruction {
Instruction::new_with_bytes(
settings::ID,
&settings::instruction::UpdateMintBridgeTokenNames {
new_name,
new_symbol,
}
.data(),
settings::accounts::UpdateMintBridgeTokenMetadata {
update_bridge: settings::accounts::UpdateBridge {
state: *STATE_PUBKEY,
protocol_authority,
bridge_data: Pubkey::find_bridge_address(&token_mint).0,
token_mint,
token_program: token::ID,
},
token_metadata: token_metadata::pda::find_metadata_account(&token_mint).0,
token_metadata_program: token_metadata::ID,
token_metadata_master: Pubkey::find_token_metadata_master_address().0,
}
.to_account_metas(None),
)
}
}
impl NewUpdateMintBridgeTokenNames for Instruction {}
lib.rs
pub fn update_mint_bridge_token_names(
ctx: Context<UpdateMintBridgeTokenMetadata>,
new_name: String,
new_symbol: String,
) -> Result<()> {
let token_metadata::state::Metadata {
data:
token_metadata::state::Data {
uri,
seller_fee_basis_points,
creators,
..
},
..
} = token_metadata::state::Metadata::from_account_info(&ctx.accounts.token_metadata)?; // todo compute offset, only serialize necessary data
invoke_signed(
&token_metadata::instruction::update_metadata_accounts_v2(
token_metadata::ID,
ctx.accounts.token_metadata.key(),
ctx.accounts.update_bridge.bridge_data.key(),
None,
Some(TokenMetadata {
name: new_name,
symbol: new_symbol,
seller_fee_basis_points,
creators,
uri,
collection: None,
uses: None,
}),
None,
None,
),
&[
ctx.accounts.token_metadata.to_account_info(),
ctx.accounts.update_bridge.bridge_data.to_account_info(),
],
&[&[
Bridge::SEED,
ctx.accounts.update_bridge.token_mint.key().as_ref(),
&[ctx.accounts.update_bridge.bridge_data.bumps.bridge],
]],
)?;
Ok(())
}
Documenting code is widely recognized as a best practice in software development, particularly for functions performing complex or business-critical tasks. Clear documentation:
• Enhances readability, allowing developers to quickly understand the function’s logic.
• Improves maintainability by reducing time spent deciphering undocumented code.
• Reduces the risk of introducing bugs, as developers can more easily identify the function’s intended behavior.
• Simplifies onboarding for new developers by providing clear guidance on existing code functionality.
Consider adding inline documentation for each of the mentioned functions, detailing:
1. Function Purpose: A brief overview of what the function does.
2. Parameters: Descriptions of each parameter, including data types and expected values.
3. Return Values: Information on what the function returns and under what conditions.
4. Error Handling: Notes on potential errors or edge cases that the function may encounter.
ACKNOWLEDGED: The deBridge team acknowledged this finding.
Halborn used automated security scanners to assist with detection of well-known security issues and vulnerabilities. Among the tools used was cargo audit
, a security scanner for vulnerabilities reported to the RustSec Advisory Database. All vulnerabilities published in https://crates.io
are stored in a repository named The RustSec Advisory Database. cargo audit
is a human-readable version of the advisory database which performs a scanning on Cargo.lock. Security Detections are only in scope. All vulnerabilities shown here were already disclosed in the above report. However, to better assist the developers maintaining this code, the auditors are including the output with the dependencies tree, and this is included in the cargo audit output to better know the dependencies affected by unmaintained and vulnerable crates.
Cargo Audit Results
ID | package | Short Description |
---|---|---|
RUSTSEC-2024-0344 | curve25519-dalek | Timing variability in `curve25519-dalek`'s `Scalar29::sub`/`Scalar52::sub` |
RUSTSEC-2022-0093 | ed25519-dalek | Double Public Key Signing Function Oracle Attack on |
RUSTSEC-2024-0332 | h2 | Degradation of service in h2 servers with CONTINUATION Flood |
RUSTSEC-2024-0003 | h2 | Resource exhaustion vulnerability in h2 may lead to Denial of Service (DoS) |
RUSTSEC-2024-0019 | mio | Tokens for named pipes may be delivered after deregistration |
RUSTSEC-2024-0357 | openssl |
|
RUSTSEC-2023-0063 | quinn-proto | Denial of service in Quinn servers |
RUSTSEC-2024-0336 | rustls |
|
RUSTSEC-2024-0006 | shlex | Multiple issues involving quote API |
RUSTSEC-2020-0071 | time | Potential segfault in the time crate |
RUSTSEC-2023-0001 | tokio | reject_remote_clients Configuration corruption |
RUSTSEC-2023-0065 | tungstenite | Tungstenite allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service |
RUSTSEC-2023-0052 | webpki | webpki: CPU denial of service in certificate path building |
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
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