Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated 07/17/2024
Date of Engagement by: July 1st, 2024 - July 8th, 2024
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
4
Critical
0
High
1
Medium
1
Low
2
Informational
0
Entangle team
engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts revisions beginning on 07/01/2024 and ending on 07/08/2024. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided to the Halborn team.
The team at Halborn was provided 7 days for the engagement and assigned a full-time security engineer to evaluate the security of the smart contract.
The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of this assessment is to:
Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended.
Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts.
In summary, Halborn identified some security risks that were mostly addressed by the Entangle team
.
Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy regarding the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance code coverage and quickly identify items that do not follow the security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used during the assessment:
Research into architecture and purpose.
Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough.
Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions. (solgraph
)
Manual assessment of use and safety for the critical Solidity variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes.
Manual testing by custom scripts.
Scanning of solidity files for vulnerabilities, security hot-spots or bugs. (MythX
)
Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions. (Slither
)
Testnet deployment. (Brownie
, Anvil
, Foundry
)
EXPLOITABILIY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
---|---|---|
Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
---|---|---|
Confidentiality (C) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
---|---|---|
Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
Severity | Score Value Range |
---|---|
Critical | 9 - 10 |
High | 7 - 8.9 |
Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
Low | 2 - 4.4 |
Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
Critical
0
High
1
Medium
1
Low
2
Informational
0
Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
---|---|---|
Missing xGorplesToken decrement in finalizeRedeemFor() | High | Solved - 07/10/2024 |
Missing Max Supply Check in pendingEmissionPerSecond | Medium | Solved - 07/10/2024 |
Irreversible State Change for isWhiteListedPeriod | Low | Not Applicable |
Centralization Risk Due to Mutable emissionStart | Low | Risk Accepted |
// High
In the xGorplesToken
contract, the function finalizeRedeemFor
is responsible for finalizing the redeeming process for a user by transferring the appropriate amount of GorplesCoin
tokens and burning the excess. However, unlike the finalizeRedeem
function, finalizeRedeemFor
does not correctly decrement the user's xGorples
balance after finalizing the redemption.
function finalizeRedeem(uint256 redeemIndex) public nonReentrant validateRedeem(msg.sender, redeemIndex) {
RedeemInfo storage _userRedeem = userRedeems[msg.sender][redeemIndex];
xBorpaBalances[msg.sender] = xBorpaBalances[msg.sender] - _userRedeem.xBorpaAmount;
// .. //
}
function finalizeRedeemFor(address _for) external onlyRole(SYSTEM) {
uint256 len = userRedeems[_for].length;
//E @audit missing decrement
while (len > 0) {
RedeemInfo storage _userRedeem = userRedeems[_for][len - 1];
bool finalized = _easyFinalizeRedeem(
_for,
_userRedeem.xBorpaAmount,
_userRedeem.endTime
);
if (finalized) {
_deleteRedeemEntry(len - 1, _for);
}
len -= 1;
}
}
This missing decrement operation results in incorrect xGorples
balances, which can lead to the user having an inflated balance and potentially redeeming more Gorples
tokens than they should be entitled to.
function testFinalizeRedeemPOC(uint256 amount) public {
//vm.assume(amount > 1e10 && amount <= INITIAL_LOOT_SUPPLY);
amount = 10e9;
// how can we transfer if transfers are banned ???
// test invalid
// borpa.transfer(user, amount);
deal(address(borpa), user, 100e18, true);
console.log(borpa.balanceOf(user));
vm.startPrank(user);
borpa.approve(address(xBorpa), type(uint256).max);
xBorpa.convert(amount);
console.log("calling redeem");
amount = amount * BURN_REMAINS / BURN_DENOMINATOR;
xBorpa.redeem(amount);
vm.warp(block.timestamp + xBorpa.REDEEM_DURATION());
uint before = borpa.balanceOf(user);
uint256 len = xBorpa.getUserRedeemsLength(user);
console.log("len", len);
(uint256 xbrp, uint256 time) = xBorpa.getUserRedeem(user, 0);
console.log("xbrp", xbrp, "time", time);
assertEq(xbrp, amount);
assertEq(len, 1);
console.log("Calling finzalize redeem");
xBorpa.finalizeRedeem(0);
amount = amount * BURN_REMAINS / BURN_DENOMINATOR;
uint afterBalance = borpa.balanceOf(user) - before;
assertApproxEqRel(afterBalance, amount, 1e10);
assertEq(xBorpa.balanceOf(address(xBorpa)), 0);
assertEq(xBorpa.getUserRedeemsLength(user), 0);
assertEq(xBorpa.xBorpaBalances(user), 0);
}
function testFinalizeRedeemPOCFor(uint256 amount) public {
//vm.assume(amount > 1e10 && amount <= INITIAL_LOOT_SUPPLY);
amount = 10e9;
// how can we transfer if transfers are banned ???
// test invalid
// borpa.transfer(user, amount);
deal(address(borpa), user, 100e18, true);
console.log(borpa.balanceOf(user));
vm.startPrank(user);
borpa.approve(address(xBorpa), type(uint256).max);
xBorpa.convert(amount);
console.log("calling redeem");
amount = amount * BURN_REMAINS / BURN_DENOMINATOR;
xBorpa.redeem(amount);
vm.warp(block.timestamp + xBorpa.REDEEM_DURATION());
uint before = borpa.balanceOf(user);
uint256 len = xBorpa.getUserRedeemsLength(user);
console.log("len", len);
(uint256 xbrp, uint256 time) = xBorpa.getUserRedeem(user, 0);
console.log("xbrp", xbrp, "time", time);
assertEq(xbrp, amount);
assertEq(len, 1);
console.log("Calling finzalize redeem For");
vm.stopPrank();
vm.startPrank(admin);
xBorpa.finalizeRedeemFor(address(user));
vm.stopPrank();
amount = amount * BURN_REMAINS / BURN_DENOMINATOR;
uint afterBalance = borpa.balanceOf(user) - before;
assertApproxEqRel(afterBalance, amount, 1e10);
assertEq(xBorpa.balanceOf(address(xBorpa)), 0);
assertEq(xBorpa.getUserRedeemsLength(user), 0);
assertEq(xBorpa.xBorpaBalances(user), 0);
}
As it can be seen in the tests, the one using finalizeRedeem
work because xGorplesToken
decrement is implemented in it but the test using finalizeRedeemFor
does not work and the assertion cannot be verified:
It is recommended to add the missing decrement operation to the finalizeRedeemFor
function to ensure the user's xGorples
balance is correctly updated.
SOLVED: The missing decrement line has been added to finalizeRedeemFor.
// Medium
The pendingEmissionPerSecond
function in the GorplesCoin
contract is responsible for calculating the pending emission per second. However, unlike the pendingEmission
function, it does not include a check to ensure that the total minted supply does not exceed the maximum supply (maxSupply
).
pendingEmission
Function:
function pendingEmission() public view returns (uint256 newEmission) {
// ...
// Cap new emissions if exceeding max supply
if (maxSupply < mintedRewardSupply + newEmission) {
newEmission = maxSupply - mintedRewardSupply;
}
}
}
The absence of a check against the maxSupply
in the pendingEmissionPerSecond
function can result in the contract minting more tokens than the intended maximum supply.
To prevent exceeding the maxSupply
, it is recommended to incorporate a check in the pendingEmissionPerSecond
function. This can be achieved by comparing the mintedRewardSupply
and the calculated emission against the maxSupply.
SOLVED: Emission is now capped according to maxSupply.
// Low
In the GorplesCoin
contract, the isWhiteListedPeriod
variable is used to manage a whitelist period during which only whitelisted addresses can transfer tokens. The function disableBlockedStatus
() allows an authorized user to set isWhiteListedPeriod
to false, thereby ending the whitelist period. However, there is no function provided to revert this change and set isWhiteListedPeriod
back to true.
// Function to disable whitelist period
function disableBlockedStatus() external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
isWhiteListedPeriod = false;
}
Once the isWhiteListedPeriod
is set to false, it cannot be reverted. This means that the whitelist period can be disabled permanently, with no possibility to re-enable it in the future.
It is recommended to implement a function to allow the re-enabling of the isWhiteListedPeriod
. This function should be restricted to authorized users, ensuring that only those with the appropriate permissions can make this change.
NOT APPLICABLE : There is no need to switch to true/false isWhiteListedPeriod
so no feature has been implemented
// Low
In the GorplesCoin
contract, the emissionStart
variable, which determines the starting point for emission calculations, can be modified by any account with the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE
. This is facilitated by the setEmissionStart
function:
function https://github.com/Entangle-Protocol/gorples-evm/blob/main/contracts/token/GorplesCoin.sol#L423(uint256 _emissionStart) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
emissionStart = _emissionStart;
}
This introduces a centralization risk where the emission schedule, critical to the token's economic model, can be altered arbitrarily.
An admin can alter the emission start time to delay or expedite token emissions, impacting the anticipated supply and distribution of tokens.
To mitigate the centralization risk and ensure the integrity of the token's emission schedule, it is recommended to make the emissionStart
variable immutable after initial deployment.
RISK ACCEPTED: The Entangle team stated that the ability to modify emissionStart
is needed to respond to unlikely but possible UX problems (frontend unavailability, etc) to ensure the emission state is up-to-date. For security reasons, they restricted this feature to admin only.
Halborn used automated testing techniques to enhance the coverage of certain areas of the smart contracts in scope. Among the tools used was Slither, a Solidity static analysis framework.
After Halborn verified the smart contracts in the repository and was able to compile them correctly into their abis and binary format, Slither was run against the contracts. This tool can statically verify mathematical relationships between Solidity variables to detect invalid or inconsistent usage of the contracts' APIs across the entire code-base.
All issues identified by Slither
were proved to be false positives or have been added to the issue list in this report.
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
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