Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated 08/29/2024
Date of Engagement by: August 21st, 2024 - August 26th, 2024
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
3
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
1
Informational
2
Entangle Labs
team engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their Photon SOL
program beginning on August 21st, 2024 and ending on August 26th, 2024. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided in the GitHub repository photon-solana. Commit hashes, and further details, can be found in the Scope section of this report.
Entangle Labs
is releasing Photon SOL
, a module that encapsulates all operations related to cross-chain messaging on the Solana blockchain, leveraging the capabilities of the Photon cross-chain messaging layer. It defines the governance and operational structure necessary to initiate, approve, and execute operations across blockchains.
Halborn
was provided 4 days for the engagement and assigned one full-time security engineer to review the security of the Solana Program in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of the assessment is to:
Identify potential security issues within the codebase.
Validate that the token airdrop logic is implemented without any security issue
Validate that the Photon SOL
program has no vulnerabilties or bugs that might compromise the working of the platform
Check that the implementation for the Solana Blockchain of the Photon SOL
program is not introducing any vulnerability
In summary, Halborn did not identify any significant security risks, but low-severity findings were acknowledged and accepted by the Entangle Labs team
. The main ones were:
Lack of validation of new admin on set_admin
function
Lack of validation of max number of transmitters and executors
Lack of event emission in critical state changes
Halborn
performed a combination of a manual review of the source code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the program assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in business logic, processes, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of programs and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.
The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:
Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the token airdrop program.
Manual program source code review to identify business logic issues.
Mapping out possible attack vectors
Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Rust variables and functions in scope that could lead to arithmetic vulnerabilities.
Scanning dependencies for known vulnerabilities (cargo audit
).
EXPLOITABILIY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
---|---|---|
Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
---|---|---|
Confidentiality (C) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
---|---|---|
Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
Severity | Score Value Range |
---|---|
Critical | 9 - 10 |
High | 7 - 8.9 |
Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
Low | 2 - 4.4 |
Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
1
Informational
2
Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
---|---|---|
Lack of validation of new admin on set_admin function | Low | Risk Accepted |
Lack of validation of max number of transmitters and executors | Informational | Acknowledged |
Lack of event emission in critical state changes | Informational | Acknowledged |
// Low
The set_admin
function does not validate that the admin
account is a valid new admin.
If the admin is set to an incorrect address, admin privileges would be disabled with no way to revert this, as admin privileges requires (potentially) a signature for execution.
set_admin.rs
pub fn set_admin(ctx: Context<SetAdmin>, admin: Pubkey) -> Result<()> {
ctx.accounts.config.admin = admin;
Ok(())
}
The highlighted line above shows that the new admin is assigned without any validation
The recommended way to implement a set_admin
functionality is to use a two-step ownership transfer pattern, with 2 potential implementations:
First, implement a function that designates a "new owner candidate." The ownership is not transferred until the new owner "accepts" it by sending a signed transaction.
Require the admin
to be a signer of the transaction.
RISK ACCEPTED: The Entangle Labs team accepted the risk of this finding.
// Informational
Transmitters and Executors are key Agents of the Entangle ecosystem.
Transmitters are a type of Agents responsible for compiling and aggregating data from various sources, including real-world data via APIs and blockchain data via RPCs.
On the other hand, Executors are a type of Agents responsible to execute operations in the Photon Endpoint Solana program.
For the Photon SOL program, both groups are set at initialization time i.e. when calling the initialize entry point with proper accounts.
Both transmitters and executors have a max number of members, being 20 on both cases as the snipper below shows:
lib.rs
/// The maximum number of transmitters that can be registered in the system.
/// Transmitters are critical for the dissemination and signing of cross-chain messages.
pub const MAX_TRANSMITTERS: usize = 20;
/// The maximum number of executors allowed within the system.
/// Executors are responsible for carrying out operations and managing transaction state transitions.
pub const MAX_EXECUTORS: usize = 20;
The current implementation of the initialize entry point is not validating that the provided arrays of transmitters and executors respects the boundaries previously mentioned, as shown in the snippet below:
pub fn initialize(
ctx: Context<Initialize>,
eob_chain_id: u64,
eob_master_smart_contract: Vec<u8>,
consensus_target_rate: u64,
gov_transmitters: Vec<EthAddress>,
gov_executors: Vec<Pubkey>,
) -> Result<()> {
ctx.accounts.config.admin = ctx.accounts.admin.key();
ctx.accounts.config.eob_chain_id = eob_chain_id;
require_eq!(eob_master_smart_contract.len(), 32);
ctx.accounts.config.eob_master_smart_contract.copy_from_slice(&eob_master_smart_contract);
ctx.accounts.protocol_info.is_init = true;
ctx.accounts.protocol_info.protocol_address = photon::ID;
ctx.accounts.protocol_info.consensus_target_rate = consensus_target_rate;
ctx.accounts.protocol_info.transmitters = Default::default();
for (i, k) in gov_transmitters.into_iter().enumerate() {
ctx.accounts.protocol_info.transmitters[i] = k;
}
ctx.accounts.protocol_info.executors = Default::default();
for (i, e) in gov_executors.into_iter().enumerate() {
ctx.accounts.protocol_info.executors[i] = e;
}
Ok(())
}
As of to now, there's no evidence that such lack of assertions generates any vulnerability.
The initialize function can only be called by a platform admin or by the DEPLOYER address, which transforms the function in a permissioned function.
If in any given case an admin incorrectly provides arrays with more members than expected, the receive_photon_msg
permissioned entry point can be used to fix the mentioned problem.
Although there is no evidence that this implementation may introduce a vulnerability, it is considered best practice to adhere to the established code constraints, as unforeseen consequences may arise that are not immediately apparent.
Implement validations in the initialize entry point to check that both transmitters and executors arrays respects the boundaries of MAX_TRANSMITTER
and MAX_EXECUTORS
respectively.
ACKNOWLEDGED: The Entangle Labs team acknowledged this finding.
// Informational
Events emission is considered a good practice to debug situations where it is necessary to check the parameters used to call an entry point.
Events can also be used to create a monitoring system to check the platform integrity in real time (or as real-time as possible).
The majority of platforms and protocols use use-case specific parameters and accounts for certain operations, so implementing events is a common practice.
In the case of CHEF, we identified at least 10 functions that changes the state without emitting an event:
set_admin
add_allowed_protocol_address
remove_allowed_protocol_address
add_allowed_proposer_address
remove_allowed_proposer_address
add_executor
remove_executor
add_transmitters_impl
remove_transmitters_impl
set_consensus_target_rate
As a consequence, critical changes can be executed in the platform without any way to monitor them.
For all of the mentioned functions, implement an event emission with proper information about old and new states.
ACKNOWLEDGED: The Entangle Labs team acknowledged this finding.
Halborn used automated security scanners to assist with detection of well-known security issues and vulnerabilities. Among the tools used was cargo audit
, a security scanner for vulnerabilities reported to the RustSec Advisory Database. All vulnerabilities published in https://crates.io
are stored in a repository named The RustSec Advisory Database. cargo audit
is a human-readable version of the advisory database which performs a scanning on Cargo.lock. Security Detections are only in scope. All vulnerabilities shown here were already disclosed in the above report. However, to better assist the developers maintaining this code, the auditors are including the output with the dependencies tree, and this is included in the cargo audit output to better know the dependencies affected by unmaintained and vulnerable crates.
Cargo Audit Results
ID | package | Short Description |
---|---|---|
RUSTSEC-2022-0093 | ed25519-dalek | Double Public Key Signing Function Oracle Attack on |
RUSTSEC-2024-0344 | curve25519-dalek | Timing variability in |
RUSTSEC-2024-0332 | h2 | Degradation of service in h2 servers with CONTINUATION Flood |
RUSTSEC-2024-0019 | mio | Tokens for named pipes may be delivered after deregistration |
RUSTSEC-2023-001 | remove_dir_all | Race Condition Enabling Link Following and Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) |
RUSTSEC-2024-0336 | rustls |
|
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
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