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Solana Programs - Huma Finance

Prepared by:

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HALBORN

Last Updated 04/01/2025

Date of Engagement: March 10th, 2025 - March 24th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

4

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

2

Informational

2

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Huma Finance engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on permissionless program beginning on March 10th, 2025 and ending on March 24th, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided in the GitHub repository huma-solana-programs, commit hashes, and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.

The Huma Finance team is releasing the permissionless program, which empowers liquidity providers (LPs) to participate in Huma liquidity pools in a fully compliant, permissionless manner. LPs benefit from attractive double-digit yields along with Huma Feathers as additional rewards.

2. Assessment Summary

Halborn was provided 10 days for the engagement and assigned one full-time security engineer to review the security of the Solana Programs in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of the assessment is to:

    • Identify potential security issues within the codebase.

    • Validate that the lenders have access to participate in the protocol by depositing their assets

    • Check that the platform allows lenders to request redemptions of their tokens in a permissionless fashion

    • Verify that the funds are correctly managed so they can only be accessible by the correct entities


In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which should be addressed by the Huma Finance team. The main ones were the following: 

    • Implement a functionality to refresh the assets of the different pool modes.

    • Verify that the modes provided to the entry points are not duplicated.



Most of the findings were addressed, and the corresponding fixes have been merged into the branches listed below. The final commits reflect the changes that solved the issues:

    • 4217cfb901a60e7a8a4166673b6884a0c7ada423 on develop branch

    • 7eb9e6c97b74edeffdd2fd7cf53f750067fb19bc on main branch



3. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn performed a combination of manual review and security testing based on scripts to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the code and can quickly identify items that do not follow the security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used during the assessment:

    • Research into architecture and purpose.

    • Differences analysis using GitLens to have a proper view of the differences between the mentioned commits

    • Graphing out functionality and programs logic/connectivity/functions along with state change


4. Caveats

    • Following a requirement from the Huma Finance team to prevent lenders from canceling redemption requests, a new commit (216f890) was added to the scope of this audit. The corresponding functionality was reviewed and confirmed to operate as intended.

    • Additionally, Huma Finance introduced a security feature aimed at improving the process for closing lender accounts. This enhancement was reviewed and confirmed to implement the intended security upgrade correctly. The corresponding functionality is included in Pull Request #208 of the huma-solana-programs repository.


5. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

5.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_e)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)		1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EE is calculated using the following formula:

E=∏meE = \prod m_e

5.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_I)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact II is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+∑mI−max(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}

5.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)		1
0.5
0.25
Scope (ss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)		1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC∗10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

6. SCOPE

REPOSITORIES
(a) Repository: huma-solana-programs
(b) Assessed Commit ID: https://github.com/00labs/huma-solana-programs/pull/207
(c) Items in scope:
  • permissionless/src/mode/instructions/cancel_redemption_request.rs
  • Only changes related with disallowing a lender to cancel a redemption request are considered in scope. Every other change in this commit is not in scope
Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.
(a) Repository: huma-solana-programs
(b) Assessed Commit ID: https://github.com/00labs/huma-solana-programs/pull/208/files
(c) Items in scope:
  • programs/permissionless/src/mode/instructions/add_redemption_request.rs
  • programs/permissionless/src/pool/instructions/process_redemption_request.rs
Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.
(a) Repository: huma-solana-programs
(b) Assessed Commit ID: c19bddf
(c) Items in scope:
  • programs/permissionless/src/common/common_utils.rs
  • programs/permissionless/src/common/constants.rs
  • programs/permissionless/src/common/errors.rs
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: programs/permissionless/src/mode/instructions/cancel_redemption_request.rs, programs/permissionless/src/mode/instructions/add_redemption_request.rs, programs/permissionless/src/pool/instructions/process_redemption_request.rs, third party dependencies and economic attacks.
Remediation Commit ID:
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

7. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

2

Informational

2

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Lack of a Direct Entry Point for Refreshing Pool Mode AssetsLowSolved - 03/18/2025
Duplicate ModeConfig Accounts Can Cause Incorrect Yield Calculations in Pre-ClosureLowSolved - 03/15/2025
Lack of Two-Step Ownership Transfer in Pool Ownership and Treasury UpdatesInformationalAcknowledged - 03/25/2025
Improving Readability in Mode Addition LogicInformationalAcknowledged - 03/25/2025

8. Findings & Tech Details

8.1 Lack of a Direct Entry Point for Refreshing Pool Mode Assets

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/00labs/huma-solana-programs/pull/204
References
This issue was identified in the c19bddf commit hash.

8.2 Duplicate ModeConfig Accounts Can Cause Incorrect Yield Calculations in Pre-Closure

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/00labs/huma-solana-programs/pull/202
References
This issue was identified in the c19bddf commit hash.

8.3 Lack of Two-Step Ownership Transfer in Pool Ownership and Treasury Updates

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
References
This issue was identified in the c19bddf commit hash.

8.4 Improving Readability in Mode Addition Logic

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
References
This issue was identified in the c19bddf commit hash.

9. Automated Testing

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

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