Moonwell // SCA (Reserve + ERC20HoldingDeposit)


Prepared by:

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HALBORN

Last Updated 03/18/2025

Date of Engagement: February 3rd, 2025 - February 5th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

2

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

1

Informational

1


1. Introduction

Moonwell engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on February 3rd, 2025 and ending on February 5th. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided in the moonwell-fi/moonwell-contracts-v2 GitHub repository. Commit hash and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.

2. Assessment Summary

Halborn was provided three days for the engagement, and assigned one full-time security engineer to review the security of the smart contracts in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced penetration testing and smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of the assessment is to:

    • Identify potential security issues within the smart contracts.

    • Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.


In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were acknowledged and accepted by the Moonwell team. The main ones are the following:

    • Implement validation checks for the returned oracle data when using the AggregatorV3Interface. Ensure that the latest returned timestamp is within the defined heartbeat interval for the requested asset.

    • Add an explicit check in the initiateSale() function to ensure that _miniAuctionPeriod > 1.

    • Create an access-controlled function, using SafeERC20 in order to allow the owner to withdraw unsold tokens after the sale.

3. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the code and can quickly identify items that do not follow the security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used during the assessment:

    • Research into architecture and purpose.

    • Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough.

    • Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions (solgraph).

    • Manual assessment of use and safety for the critical Solidity variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes.

    • Manual testing by custom scripts.

    • Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions (slither).

    • Testnet deployment (Foundry).

4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_e)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)
1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EE is calculated using the following formula:

E=meE = \prod m_e

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_I)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact II is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+mImax(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)
1
0.5
0.25
Scope (ss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)
1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

1

Informational

1

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Missing oracle data staleness checkLowRisk Accepted - 02/12/2025
Division by zeroInformationalAcknowledged - 02/12/2025

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Missing oracle data staleness check

// Low

Description

In the ReserveAutomation contract, the getPriceAndDecimals() function checks that the returned price is positive and that the round is valid, using answeredInRound >= roundId and updatedAt != 0, but it does not check that the price data is recent. In some applications, using stale oracle data is a risk.


    /// @notice helper function to retrieve price from chainlink
    /// @param oracleAddress The address of the chainlink oracle
    /// returns the price and then the decimals of the given asset
    /// reverts if price is 0 or if the oracle data is invalid
    function getPriceAndDecimals(
        address oracleAddress
    ) public view returns (int256, uint8) {
        (
            uint80 roundId,
            int256 price,
            ,
            uint256 updatedAt,
            uint80 answeredInRound
        ) = AggregatorV3Interface(oracleAddress).latestRoundData();
        bool valid = price > 0 && answeredInRound >= roundId && updatedAt != 0;
        require(valid, "ReserveAutomationModule: Oracle data is invalid");
        uint8 oracleDecimals = AggregatorV3Interface(oracleAddress).decimals();

        return (price, oracleDecimals); /// price always gt 0 at this point
    }

The getPriceAndDecimals() function does not adequately handle cases where the oracle returns the latest timestamp (updatedAt) outside the defined heartbeat interval for the requested asset.

Specifically, when using the AggregatorV3Interface from Chainlink, it is essential to validate the updatedAt timestamp returned by the latestRoundData function to ensure it is within acceptable ranges.

BVSS
Recommendation

Implement validation checks for the returned oracle data when using the AggregatorV3Interface. Ensure that the latest returned timestamp is within the defined heartbeat interval for the requested asset.

Remediation Comment

RISK ACCEPTED: The Moonwell team has accepted the risk related to this finding.

7.2 Division by zero

// Informational

Description

In the ReserveAutomation contract, the discount (or premium) is computed in the function currentDiscount(), as follows:


    /// @notice Calculates the current discount or premium rate for reserve purchases
    /// @return The current discount as a percentage scaled to 1e18, returns
    /// 1e18 if no discount is applied
    /// @dev Does not apply discount or premium if the sale is not active
    function currentDiscount() public view returns (uint256) {
        if (!isSaleActive()) {
            return SCALAR;
        }

        uint256 decayDelta = startingPremium - maxDiscount;
        uint256 periodStart = getCurrentPeriodStartTime();
        uint256 periodEnd = getCurrentPeriodEndTime();
        uint256 saleTimeRemaining = periodEnd - block.timestamp;

        /// calculate the current premium or discount at the current time based
        /// on the length you are into the current period
        return
            maxDiscount +
            (decayDelta * saleTimeRemaining) /
            (periodEnd - periodStart);
    }

The value for periodStart is obtained from the return of the getCurrentPeriodEndTime() function, defined as follows:

    /// @notice Returns the end time of the current mini auction period
    /// @return The timestamp when the current mini auction period ends
    /// @dev Returns 0 if no sale is active or if the sale hasn't started yet
    /// @dev Each period is exactly miniAuctionPeriod in length
    function getCurrentPeriodEndTime() public view returns (uint256) {
        uint256 startTime = getCurrentPeriodStartTime();
        if (startTime == 0) {
            return 0;
        }

        return startTime + miniAuctionPeriod - 1;
    }

In other words, the denominator becomes periodEnd - periodStart = miniAuctionPeriod - 1. If the miniAuctionPeriod is set to 1 - which is possible, because the condition in the require statement of the initiateSale() function is as follows: _auctionPeriod / _miniAuctionPeriod > 1.


In extremely rare conditions, where _miniAuctionPeriod is 1 and _auctionPeriod is 2, then the denominator is zero and the contract will revert with a division-by-zero error.

BVSS
Recommendation

It is recommended to add an explicit check in the initiateSale() function to ensure that _miniAuctionPeriod > 1. For example:


require(_miniAuctionPeriod > 1, "ReserveAutomation: Mini auction period too short");

Alternatively, update the NatSpec documentation to provide proper information regarding the mini auction period.

Remediation Comment

ACKNOWLEDGED: The Moonwell team has acknowledged this issue.

8. Automated Testing

Halborn used automated testing techniques to enhance the coverage of certain areas of the smart contracts in scope. Among the tools used was Slither, a Solidity static analysis framework. After Halborn verified the smart contracts in the repository and was able to compile them correctly into their ABIs and binary format, Slither was run against the contracts. This tool can statically verify mathematical relationships between Solidity variables to detect invalid or inconsistent usage of the contracts' APIs across the entire code-base.


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All issues identified by Slither were proved to be false positives or have been added to the issue list in this report.

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

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Moonwell // SCA (Reserve + ERC20HoldingDeposit)

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