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Background

// Security Assessment

02.12.2025 - 02.21.2025

Governance

Onyx DAO

Halborn logotext
← Back to Audits

Governance - Onyx DAO


Prepared by:

Halborn Logo

HALBORN

Last Updated 03/10/2025

Date of Engagement: February 12th, 2025 - February 21st, 2025

Summary

92% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

12

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

4

Informational

8


Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Assessment summary
  • 3. Test approach and methodology
  • 4. Risk methodology
  • 5. Scope
  • 6. Assessment summary & findings overview
  • 7. Findings & Tech Details
    1. 7.1 Rewards are not guaranteed to be deposited
    2. 7.2 Possible dos of proposals
    3. 7.3 Restrictions are not enforced in the constructor
    4. 7.4 Centralization risk
    5. 7.5 Use of unsafe functions for erc20 interactions
    6. 7.6 Custom errors should be used
    7. 7.7 The length of an array is not cached before loops
    8. 7.8 Use of memory instead of calldata for an unmodified function argument
    9. 7.9 Insufficient test coverage
    10. 7.10 Consider using named mappings
    11. 7.11 Floating pragma
    12. 7.12 Reentrancy allows manipulation of voting power
  • 8. Automated Testing

1. Introduction

Onyx engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on February 12th, 2025 and ending on February 21th, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided to Halborn. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.

The Onyx codebase in scope consist of 4 different solidity files:

    • MasterChef contract: Its purpose is to distribute rewards to stakers based on their stake.

    • CHNGovernance contract: It allows users to create proposals and vote on them.

    • CHNTimelock contract: It is responsible for queuing and executing proposals from the CHNGovernance contract.

    • CHNStaking contract: It enables users to stake tokens, rewards them based on their stakes, and tracks their voting power.

2. Assessment Summary

Halborn was provided 8 days for the engagement and assigned 1 full-time security engineer to review the security of the smart contracts in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of the assessment is to:

    • Identify potential security issues within the smart contracts.

    • Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.

In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which should be addressed by the Onyx team. The main ones were the following:

    • Consider enforcing the maxXcnPerSecond parameter in the constructor, or remove it entirely.

    • Consider using multisig wallet address for the guardian address. Additionally consider adding functionality to change the guardian address in the CHNGovernance contract.

    • Consider adding the proposal id into the calculation of the operation id in the _queueOrRevert() function.

    • Consider caching the length of the proposal.targets array before you loop over them.

3. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn performed a combination of manual review of the code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of smart contracts and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.

The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:

    • Research into architecture, purpose and use of the platform.

    • Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough to identify any logic issue.

    • Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Solidity variables and functions in scope that could lead to arithmetic related vulnerabilities.

    • Local testing with custom scripts (Foundry).

    • Fork testing against main networks (Foundry).

    • Static analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions(Slither).


4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_eme​)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)
1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EEE is calculated using the following formula:

E=∏meE = \prod m_eE=∏me​

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_ImI​)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact III is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+∑mI−max(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}I=max(mI​)+4∑mI​−max(mI​)​

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CCC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rrr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)
1
0.5
0.25
Scope (sss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)
1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CCC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rsC=rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SSS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC∗10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)S=min(10,EIC∗10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

REPOSITORY
(a) Repository: 0xdec2f31c3984f3440540dc78ef21b1369d4ef767
(b) Assessed Commit ID: https://etherscan.io/address/0xdec2f31c3984f3440540dc78ef21b1369d4ef767
(c) Items in scope:
  • address/0xdec2f31c3984f3440540dc78ef21b1369d4ef767
  • address/0x08eDF0F2AF8672029eb445742B3b4072c6158DF3
  • address/0x23445c63feef8d85956dc0f19ade87606d0e19a9
  • address/0x3fa642c0bbad64569eb8424af35f518347249216
  • address/0xdec2f31c3984f3440540dc78ef21b1369d4ef767
  • address/0x08eDF0F2AF8672029eb445742B3b4072c6158DF3
  • address/0x23445c63feef8d85956dc0f19ade87606d0e19a9
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

4

Informational

8

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Rewards are not guaranteed to be depositedLowRisk Accepted - 03/03/2025
Possible DOS of proposalsLowRisk Accepted - 03/03/2025
Restrictions are not enforced in the constructorLowRisk Accepted - 03/03/2025
Centralization riskLowRisk Accepted - 03/03/2025
Use of unsafe Functions for ERC20 InteractionsInformationalAcknowledged - 03/03/2025
Custom errors should be usedInformationalAcknowledged - 03/03/2025
The length of an array is not cached before loopsInformationalAcknowledged - 03/03/2025
Use of memory instead of calldata for an unmodified function argumentInformationalAcknowledged - 03/03/2025
Insufficient test coverageInformationalAcknowledged - 03/03/2025
Consider using named mappingsInformationalAcknowledged - 03/03/2025
Floating pragmaInformationalAcknowledged - 03/03/2025
Reentrancy allows manipulation of voting powerInformational-

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Rewards are not guaranteed to be deposited

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:C (3.3)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
References
https://etherscan.io/address/0x3fa642c0bbad64569eb8424af35f518347249216#code

7.2 Possible DOS of proposals

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:C/I:N/D:N/Y:N (3.3)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
References
https://etherscan.io/address/0xdec2f31c3984f3440540dc78ef21b1369d4ef767#code#L99

7.3 Restrictions are not enforced in the constructor

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:L (2.5)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
References
https://etherscan.io/address/0x3fa642c0bbad64569eb8424af35f518347249216#code#732

7.4 Centralization risk

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:C/Y:C (2.5)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
References
https://etherscan.io/address/0xdec2f31c3984f3440540dc78ef21b1369d4ef767#code#L43

7.5 Use of unsafe Functions for ERC20 Interactions

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:L/Y:N (0.5)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
References
https://etherscan.io/address/0x3fa642c0bbad64569eb8424af35f518347249216#code#L935

7.6 Custom errors should be used

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
References
https://etherscan.io/address/0x23445c63feef8d85956dc0f19ade87606d0e19a9#code#L1316
https://etherscan.io/address/0xdec2f31c3984f3440540dc78ef21b1369d4ef767#code#L25
https://etherscan.io/address/0x08eDF0F2AF8672029eb445742B3b4072c6158DF3#code#229
https://etherscan.io/address/0x3fa642c0bbad64569eb8424af35f518347249216#code#536

7.7 The length of an array is not cached before loops

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
References
https://etherscan.io/address/0xdec2f31c3984f3440540dc78ef21b1369d4ef767#code#L99
https://etherscan.io/address/0xdec2f31c3984f3440540dc78ef21b1369d4ef767#code#L115

7.8 Use of memory instead of calldata for an unmodified function argument

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
References
https://etherscan.io/address/0x08eDF0F2AF8672029eb445742B3b4072c6158DF3#code#L262
https://etherscan.io/address/0xdec2f31c3984f3440540dc78ef21b1369d4ef767#code#L99
https://etherscan.io/address/0xdec2f31c3984f3440540dc78ef21b1369d4ef767#code#L110

7.9 Insufficient test coverage

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:F/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.10 Consider using named mappings

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
References
https://etherscan.io/address/0x3fa642c0bbad64569eb8424af35f518347249216#code#718
https://etherscan.io/address/0x08eDF0F2AF8672029eb445742B3b4072c6158DF3#code#216
https://etherscan.io/address/0xdec2f31c3984f3440540dc78ef21b1369d4ef767#code#L117
https://etherscan.io/address/0x23445c63feef8d85956dc0f19ade87606d0e19a9#code#L1101

7.11 Floating pragma

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
References
https://etherscan.io/address/0x08eDF0F2AF8672029eb445742B3b4072c6158DF3#code#L195

7.12 Reentrancy allows manipulation of voting power

//

Informational

Description
Score
(0.0)
References
https://etherscan.io/address/0x23445c63feef8d85956dc0f19ade87606d0e19a9#code#L1316

8. Automated Testing

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Assessment summary
  • 3. Test approach and methodology
  • 4. Risk methodology
  • 5. Scope
  • 6. Assessment summary & findings overview
  • 7. Findings & Tech Details
    1. 7.1 Rewards are not guaranteed to be deposited
    2. 7.2 Possible dos of proposals
    3. 7.3 Restrictions are not enforced in the constructor
    4. 7.4 Centralization risk
    5. 7.5 Use of unsafe functions for erc20 interactions
    6. 7.6 Custom errors should be used
    7. 7.7 The length of an array is not cached before loops
    8. 7.8 Use of memory instead of calldata for an unmodified function argument
    9. 7.9 Insufficient test coverage
    10. 7.10 Consider using named mappings
    11. 7.11 Floating pragma
    12. 7.12 Reentrancy allows manipulation of voting power
  • 8. Automated Testing

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